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INTRODUCTION 
The case of R. v. G and Rl is the latest to raise the issue of the appropriate test to be 
applied to determine recklessness in cases where young persons are prosecuted for 
criminal damage under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. 
Section 1(1) of the Act provides that "a person who without lawful excuse destroys 
or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any 
such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed 
or damaged shall be guilty of an offence". Section 1(2) provides that a person who 
intentionally or recklessly destroys or damages any property, "intending . . . to 
endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would 
be endangered" is guilty of an offence. Where the property is destroyed or damaged by 
fire, it is charged as arson.2 The offence can be committed either intentionally or 
recklessly. The test for recklessness, established in R v. Caldwell,3 has two stages. First, 
a person is reckless as to whether property is destroyed or damaged if he or she does 
an act which in fact creates an obvious and serious risk that property will be destroyed 
or damaged. Second, when the person does the act, he or she either has not given any 
thought to the possibility of there being any such risk, or has recognised that there was 
some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it. This has become know as 
"the Caldwell test". It is sometimes referred to as objective recklessness, because a 
person may be liable, even though not aware of a risk, for failing to consider a risk 
that would be obvious to the "ordinary, prudent individual".4 
T H E DECISION IN R. v. G and R 
G and R, who were aged 11 and 12 respectively, were camping out for the night. In 
the early hours of the morning, they entered the yard of a shop, opened up bundles 
of newspapers, and set some of them alight. They threw the burning newspapers under 
a large wheelie-bin, leaving them to burn. The bin caught fire, the fire spread to the 
shop and some adjoining buildings, causing approximately £1 million of damage. The 
boys first denied any involvement, but later admitted what had happened. They said, 
however, that they thought that the ignited newspapers would burn themselves out on 
the concrete floor, and that it never crossed their minds that there was a risk that the 
fire would spread to the building. 
The boys were charged with arson, contrary to sections 1(1) and (3) of the Criminal 
Damage Act 1971, on the grounds that they caused damage to property, being reckless 
as to whether such property would be damaged. The trial judge directed the jury in 
accordance with the Caldwell test. Thus, for the purposes of deciding whether the boys 
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had been reckless as to whether property would be destroyed or damaged, the risk had 
to be obvious to the ordinary prudent individual, rather than to a person possessing 
the characteristics of G and R. The trial judge made it clear that no allowance was 
made by the law for the youth, lack of maturity or inability of the boys to assess the 
consequences of their actions. 
The boys were convicted of the offence and sentenced to a one-year supervision 
order. They appealed, the basis of the appeal being that the judge was wrong to rule 
that the Caldwell test was the correct test to apply. He should have held either that it 
does not apply to children, or if it does, that it is incompatible with Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, 
holding that the decision in Caldwell was binding, and that therefore the judge had 
correctly directed the jury for the purposes of deciding whether the boys had acted 
recklessly. As for the human rights challenge, Article 6 was not concerned with the 
fairness of the provisions of substantive law, and therefore the appeal was also rejected 
on this ground. 
CALDWELL RECKLESSNESS 
The case of R. v. Caldwell was itself concerned with section 1(1) and 1(2) of the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971. The accused in that case set fire to a hotel, but claimed 
that when he did so he was so drunk that it did not occur to him that there might 
be anyone there whose life might be endangered. Caldwell's appeal to the House of 
Lords turned on the question of whether self-induced intoxication can be relevant to 
cases of intention or recklessness in relation to the endangering of life. Lord Diplock 
examined the states of mind that might constitute recklessness. On the one hand, a 
person may realise that some risk is involved, and on the other, a person "may not 
even trouble" to consider the possibility of a risk. He concluded that neither state of 
mind "seems . . . to be less blameworthy",5 and on that basis it was decided that 
recklessness should have a wider meaning than was originally thought. He decided6 
that recklessness therefore includes not only deciding to ignore a risk of harmful 
consequences resulting from one's acts that one has recognised as existing,7 but 
also failing to give any thought to whether or not there is any such risk in circum-
stances where, if any thought were given to the matter, it would be obvious that 
there was.8 
This view accords with the law in relation to self-induced intoxication, as established 
by R. v. MajewskP some five years earlier. That case established that self-induced 
intoxication is no defence to a crime in which recklessness is enough to constitute 
the necessary mens rea. An intoxicated person cannot be excused for being unaware 
of a risk, if that risk would have been obvious to him or her if sober. However, 
Lord Diplock's judgment is not expressed in a way that confines this definition of 
recklessness to cases of self-induced intoxication. It has a more general application. 
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The extent of its application was tested the following year in Elliot v. C, 1 0 another 
criminal damage case. Here, the accused was unaware of the risk of damage not 
because she was drunk, but because she was a 14 year-old, who was below average 
intelligence. The lower court said that it was implicit in the decision in Caldwell that 
defendants should only be held to have acted recklessly where the risk would have been 
obvious to them, if they had given any thought to the matter. As it was found that 
C would not have been aware of the risk, no matter how much thought she had given 
to the matter, the case was dismissed. The Divisional Court reluctantly allowed the 
prosecutor's appeal, despite the fact that this was not a case of a "deliberate disregard" 
or "mindless indifference" to a risk," but because they were "constrained by 
authority".12 The court could find no reason to qualify Lord Diplock's speech to 
import an interpretation which would make a person reckless for giving no thought 
to an obvious risk, only where it would have been obvious to him or her if they had 
given thought to the matter. 
This approach was confirmed in R. v. R (Stephen Malcolm)13 in the following year. 
This case concerned a 15 year-old boy, and it was argued that the test of recklessness 
should be whether a person of the age of the defendant, and with his characteristics 
which might be relevant to his ability to foresee risk, would have appreciated the risk 
involved. The Court of Appeal was clear that it was not open to the court to accept 
this suggested modification to the Caldwell test. More recently, in R. v. Coles,14 where 
a 15 year-old set a barn alight, the defence wished to call expert evidence from a 
psychologist on the capacity of the defendant to foresee the risks involved in his 
actions. The trial judge refused to allow this evidence, and rejected the defence 
submission that the test for recklessness should be subjective. The point of contention 
in the case was not in relation to the intention to damage the property, but in relation 
to the recklessness as to whether the lives of the defendant's two friends would be 
endangered by setting fire to a barn in which they were sleeping. The Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appeal, declining the invitation to reformulate the law on recklessness, 
because it had "so recently been confirmed, after full consideration, by a decision of 
the House of Lords".1 5 
C R I T I C I S M S O F C A L D W E L L 
The Caldwell test has been subjected to much criticism since it was first handed down. 
In a commentary on the case, the late Professor J . C . Smith noted that it set back the 
law "concerning the mental element in criminal damage . . . to before 1861".16 Smith 
and Hogan noted that "Caldwell, as interpreted in Elliott v. C, appears to be a slippery 
slope to intolerable injustice with no obvious exit".17 H o w can the mens rea of the 
defendant be the mental state of some non-existent hypothetical person? Surely the 
question should be whether the risk was an obvious risk to that defendant. Its "most 
damning moral indictment" is that defendants can be convicted without having 
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had a fair opportunity to make their behaviour correspond with the law, because they 
lacked the capacity to foresee a risk.18 It has been argued that, even if there is a 
presumption that defendants are capable of foreseeing the risks that the reasonable 
person would see as obvious, they should be able to present evidence that they were 
not at the time capable of doing so, provided that the incapacity was not self-induced.19 
Professor Smith thought that the decision might have to be reversed by legislation,20 
but it has proved to be a durable rule. That it has existed for so long is probably due 
to the fact that it has not been given general application, and is now mainly confined 
to criminal damage cases. It did apply to the statutory offence of causing death by 
reckless driving,21 but is no longer relevant in driving cases, as the earlier offence of 
reckless driving has now been replaced by causing death by dangerous driving.22 It is 
not applicable to manslaughter,23 assault24 or rape,25 and does not apply to offences 
against the person involving malice.26 More recently, it has been held that subjective 
recklessness is required for the offence of causing annoyance by flying.27 The 
undesirable effects of the decision have thus been mitigated to some extent. Notably, 
Caldwell has not been applied in a number of Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
However, as in other cases before the Court of Appeal, the court in R. v. G and R 
felt unable to hold that the Caldwell test should not be applied. Like the other attempts 
to distinguish Caldwell or to persuade the court not to apply Caldwell, this too failed. 
The Court of Appeal was clear that all the previous authority supported the Caldwell 
approach, and it was not open to it to depart from a decision of the House of Lords. 
H U M A N R I G H T S 
Another approach adopted in this case was to argue the appeal on the basis that the 
Caldwell test was incompatible with the rights under the Human Rights Act 1998. The 
argument was based on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which guarantees the right to a fair trial. Article 6(1) states that: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law . . . 
This article sets the standard to be applied in determining whether a trial has been 
fair, including for example, providing access to a court. Defendants are to have, for 
example, adequate notice of the proceedings, a real opportunity to present the case and 
are entitled to a reasoned decision. 
The defence argued that to judge the moral and legal culpability of a child by 
reference to the understanding and life experience of an adult is irrational and, 
therefore, unfair. Moreover, the Caldwell test is disproportionately harsh given the 
serious consequences that can potentially flow from a conviction under section 1 of the 
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1971 Act, which is detention for life. The Court of Appeal felt that these submissions 
were misconceived. Although Article 6 should be given a "broad and purposive 
interpretation",28 it is concerned with the procedural aspects of trials, not with the 
fairness of the provisions of substantive law. The Caldwell test defines the mental 
element of the offence. It is "a matter of substantive law since it is part of the very 
definition of what constitutes the offence".29 To come within the concerns of Article 6, 
the matter would have to be procedural, for example, the point at issue would have to 
concern the means by which the existence of such a mental element may be proved. 
It is for Contracting States to choose how to define the essential elements of an 
offence, and Article 6 is not concerned with the fairness of substantive law.30 Offences 
of strict liability, for example, do not violate Article 6(2), which provides that those 
charged with criminal offences "shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law".31 The Court of Appeal was quite clear therefore that the fairness 
of the test, as it applied to children, was not justiciable under Article 6, and the appeal 
was dismissed on this ground too. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Another attempt to challenge the effect of the Caldwell decision has been unsuccessful, 
so it is carry on Caldwell, until and unless the House of Lords addresses the issue and 
decides otherwise.32 The Court of Appeal has certified a point of law for decision by 
the House of Lords, as follows: 
Can a defendant properly be convicted under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 
on the basis that he was reckless as to whether property was destroyed or damaged when 
he gave no thought to the risk but, by reason of his age and/or personal characteristics the 
risk would not have been obvious to him, even if he had thought about it? 
The Court of Appeal declined to give leave to appeal, leaving it to the House to 
decide whether they wished to receive the appeal or not. It is to be hoped that the 
House of Lords does decide to revisit Caldwell, and reconsider the "important issue"33 
of the proper interpretation of section 1 the Criminal Damage Act 1971. 
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